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AN APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, PRESIDING 
APPELLANT'S JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred pursuant to the 
provisions of §78-2a-3 (2) (i) Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1993) This 
action involves the appeal of certain provisions of Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce signed and entered 
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah on April 29, 1993. A timely Notice of Appeal was 
filed on May 26, 1993. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Copies of the following are found in Addendum A to this brief: 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(5) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mrs. Mary Coelho, the plaintiff-appellant in this case, filed 
a complaint against her husband, Alcides J. Coelho, the defendant-
respondent, seeking a decree of divorce, sole custody of the 
parties' minor children, alimony, child support, a fair and 
equitable division of the real and personal property, and 
attorney's fees. The case was tried before the Honorable David S. 
Young for two and one-half hours on February 11, 1993. 
Each side was represented by counsel and presented documentary 
evidence. Mrs. Coelho testified, but Mr. Coelho's testimony was 
proffered by his counsel due to the time constraints imposed by the 
court. In addition, Mr. Coelho presented testimony of two 
witnesses, both of whom had provided tax and accounting services on 
his behalf. 
After brief closing arguments, the trial court ruled from the 
bench. Defendant's counsel submitted Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of Divorce on April 9, 1993. Plaintiff's counsel 
filed her Objections to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce on April 19, 1993. On April 29, 1993, after 
defendant's counsel submitted his Reply to Objections, the court 
entered its Minute Entry denying the objections and entering the 
2 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce that had 
been submitted by defendant's counsel. Plaintiff's Notice of 
Appeal was filed on May 26, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The plaintiff/appellant, Mrs. Mary Coelho (hereinafter Mrs. 
Coelho or wife), and defendant/respondent, Alcides J. Coelho 
(hereinafter Mr. Coelho or husband) , were married on July 16, 1977. 
(Tr.p. 59 line 18) Three children were born as issue of this 
marriage, Sara, now 15 years of age, born August 7, 1978; Tony, now 
13 years of age, born August 19, 1980; and Emily, now 7 years of 
age, born September 29, 1986. (R. 2, 13) At the trial, the parties 
stipulated that the two youngest children would remain in Mrs. 
Coelho7s custody, and that the oldest child would remain in the 
custody of Mr. Coelho. (Tr.p. 4, lines 7-9) The parties stipulated 
to liberal visitation for each of them with the child or children 
not in their physical custody. (Tr.p. 4-5) 
The parties' middle child, Tony, is handicapped and has been 
diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD), (Tr.p. 61, line 
6), with hyperactivity and multiple learning disabilities. (Tr.p. 
61 line 7) Tony requires substantial personal time, attention and 
care from Mrs. Coelho (Tr.p. 61 lines 11-18; Tr. p.66 lines 20-25; 
Tr.p. 67, lines 1-25; Tr.p. 68, lines 1-25), and receives regular 
psychological therapy and medication. (Tr. p.63, lines 9-25; Tr.p. 
64, lines 1-15) 
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After the parties married, Mrs. Coelho did not complete her 
college education as an art major. (Tr.p. 71 lines 19-21; line 23) 
She held various jobs, in addition to being a full-time homemaker 
and mother. (Tr.p. 73, lines 5-13) Dver the course of the 
marriage, she worked as a real estate agent during the 1980's 
(Tr.p. 74, lines 16-17), as a ski repairer (Tr.p. 73, line 8), and 
as a bookkeeper for Mr. Coelho's business. (Tr.p. 73, lines 12-13) 
At the time of trial, Mrs. Coelho was a full-time pre-nursing 
student. (Tr.p. 81, lines 3-4) She was also working fifty hours 
per week at two jobs, one as a ski instructor (seasonal) (Tr.p. 80, 
line 23), and the other as a trainer in a center for handicapped 
adults. (Tr.p. 80, line 23) Plaintiff's gross monthly combined 
earnings from the two jobs were approximately $1,329. (Tr.p. 80-83, 
Exhibits 12, 13) 
Mr. Coelho is a contractor and ran his own business, Coelho 
Construction Company, during most of the marriage. (R-341) His 
earnings during the last three years of the parties' marriage, 
before deductions for necessary and discretionary business 
expenses, were $69,032 in 1990 (Exhibit 9); $76,954 in 1991 
(Exhibit 10); and $95,346 in 1992. (Exhibit 21) Mr. Coelho's 
business expenses, as shown on the tax returns (Exhibits 8, 9, 10) , 
included deductions for depreciation, use of personal residence as 
an office, telephone charges, and entertainment. At the time of 
trial, Mr. Coelho was still self-employed, but proffered that his 
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projected income for 1993 would be less than his 1992 net schedule 
"C" income of $95,346. (Tr.p. 124, line 24) 
At the time the Plaintiff filed for divorce, the parties owned 
a home, a 1984 Toyota 4-Runner, a 1983 Toyota Landcruiser, a 1976 
Ford truck, two (2) horses and tack, a horse trailer, various items 
of household furniture and furnishings, and interests in two 
businesses known as Solamere Partnership and New Classic 
Development. (R. 4-7) The home had an agreed upon value of 
approximately $300,000 (Tr.p. 3); a first mortgage against it of 
approximately $140,000 (Tr.p. 12); and a second mortgage 
obligation, a line of credit, which had a balance of approximately 
$34,000 at the time of trial. (Tr.p. 12) 
Prior to the trial, Mr. Coelho moved the court to allow him to 
use this line of credit to pay his temporary support obligations 
(R. 115-116), and in its Minute Entry on December 16, 1992, the 
court granted the motion, reserving the issue of whether Mr. Coelho 
would be required to repay the amounts used until time of trial. 
(R. 273) At the trial, Mrs. Coelho proffered that at least $7,000 
of the line-of-credit was incurred by Mr. Coelho to pay his 
temporary support obligations during the last few months of 1992. 
(Tr.p. 13) 
Mrs. Coelho testified that her earnings as a real estate agent 
had fluctuated greatly and that in the one year in which she had 
substantial earnings from sales, 1985, it was due to the fact that 
she had received a very large commission on the sale of one 
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property. (Tr.p. 75, lines 15-20) The commission was paid to Mrs. 
Coelho over three years, with her receiving the largest portion in 
one year and $10,000 a year for the following two years. (Tr. p. 
75, lines 23-24) In subsequent years, her earnings dropped 
dramatically, and the increasing needs cf the children demanded 
that she spend more and more time at home attending to their needs. 
(Tr.p. 76; lines 4-10) Mrs. Coelho also testified that her average 
net earnings, including extra amounts earned during the busy 
Christmas ski season, were $1,121.54 per month (Exhibit 15), and 
that her monthly expenses, for herself and two of the parties' 
three children, were $3,560.00. (Exhibit 14) Mrs. Coelho testified 
that she had a monthly shortfall, between the amount of income she 
could generate through her own efforts and the expenses for herself 
and the two children, of $2,438.46. (Tr.p. 85, line 11) 
Plaintiff's counsel offered evidence at trial regarding the 
availability of construction work in both Park City and Summit 
County (Tr.p. 10, lines 10-25; Tr.p. 11, lines 1-4) to establish 
that there was ample work available in the area and to substantiate 
her claim that Mr. Coelho was voluntarily underemployed. Defendant 
objected on the basis of relevancy, and the court excluded this 
evidence from its determinations. (Tr. 93, lines 11-12) 
At trial, Mr. Coelho did not testify, but his counsel 
proffered his testimony to the court, including Mr. Coelho's claim 
that, while 1992 was a very good year <Tr.p. 125, line 4) , he 
believed he would not make as much in 1993. Mrs. Coelho's counsel 
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was not allowed to cross-examine Mr. Coelho regarding his testimony 
because of the time limitations imposed by the court. However, 
Mrs. Coelho took the position that the court should find that Mr. 
Coelho's monthly income averaged over the years 1989 through 1992 
was $6,500. Mr. Coehlo's counsel proffered at trial that his 
living expenses were $3,490 per month. (Exhibit 25) 
At the conclusion of the proffer, the trial court asked the 
parties to waive closing arguments or, in the alternative, return 
the following day for that purpose. Because of other commitments, 
counsel had minimal time to argue the evidence but chose to 
proceed. The trial court asked counsel to suggest approximate 
levels of support that should be awarded, and advised counsel for 
the plaintiff that it would not take the time to review the 
documentary evidence she submitted at trial. (Tr.p. 128, lines 13-
25) 
The trial court, ruling from the bench, found that Mrs. 
Coelho's income was the amount of $1,500 per month (Tr.p. 138, line 
25), and that Mr. Coelho's income was $5,000 per month. (Tr.p. 
136, line 24) The court, in its ruling: 
(a) awarded child support to Mrs. Coelho in the amount of 
$619.00 per month; (Tr.p. 139, lines 1-2) 
(b) ordered the parties to share the costs in Tony's therapy 
proportionately, with Mrs. Coelho to pay 3 0% and Mr. Coelho to pay 
70% of said costs; (Tr.p. 139, lines 20-24) 
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(c) awarded alimony to Mrs. Coelho in the amount of $1,000 per 
month, for a period of one year, (Tr.p. 13.9, line 6) , at which time 
she could petition the court for a reevaluation to determine 
whether alimony should be terminated at that time or extended based 
upon the circumstances then existing; (Tr.p. 139, lines 6-10) 
(d) ordered Mrs. Coelho to pay one-half of any tax liability 
owed by the parties for the 1992 tax year (Tr.p. 141; lines 18-23) , 
despite the fact that the parties had lived apart since October 7, 
1991; (R. 30) 
(e) ordered that Mrs. Coelho's one-half of the net proceeds 
resulting from the sale of the home be reduced by one-half of the 
total amount of the equity line mortgage, despite the fact that Mr. 
Coelho had used a substantial portion of it to satisfy his 
temporary support obligations; (Tr.p. 141, lines 1-17) and 
(f) awarded Mrs. Coelho the sum of $3,000 for her attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in the action (Tr.p. 140, lines 5-7), 
despite her claim for fees in excess of $10,000; 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of 
Divorce, prepared by Mr. Coelho's counsel were, over the objection 
of Mrs. Coelho's counsel, were signed and entered by the court on 
April 29, 1993. (A copy of each is included in Addendum B to this 
Brief.) 
Mrs. Coelho filed her Notice of Appeal on May 26, 1993. (R. 
361-62) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. It was an abuse of discretion to arbitrarily restrict the 
time allowed for Mrs. Coelho to present her case, without prior 
notice or opportunity to prepare for such restrictions. 
2. It was prejudicial error for the court to allow Mr. 
Coelho's testimony to be proffered, thereby denying Mrs. Coelho's 
counsel the right to cross-examine him, and it was also prejudicial 
error to refuse to review the documentary evidence submitted by 
Plaintiff at trial. 
3. It was prejudicial error to exclude evidence of the 
availability of construction in Park City and Summit County, 
thereby affecting the substantial rights of Mrs. Coelho. 
4. The court's findings as to the parties' gross incomes 
were clearly erroneous and not supported by the evidence, and the 
award of financial support based on those finds was inadequate and 
an abuse of the court's discretion. 
5. It was an abuse of the court's discretion to award Mrs. 
Coelho an inadequate alimony sum of $1,000 per month, and to limit 
the award to a period of one year, in light of Mr. Coelho's 
historical ability to pay alimony, Mrs. Coelho's monthly needs, her 
ability to provide for her own needs, the parties' established 
standard of living during the marriage, and the length of the 
parties' marriage (16 years). 
6. It was an abuse of the court's discretion to order Mrs. 
Coelho to pay from her share of the net proceeds resulting from the 
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sale of the parties' home one-half of the equity line mortgage, a 
substantial portion of which was incurred oy Mr. Coelho to meet his 
temporary support obligations. 
7. It was an abuse of the court's discretion to order Mrs. 
Coelho to pay one-half of the parties' tax obligation for 1992, 
when the parties had been separated since October of 1991, and Mr. 
Coelho's ability to pay the debt greatly exceeded Mrs. Coelho's 
ability. 
8. It was an abuse of the court's discretion to order Mrs. 
Coelho to pay 3 0% of the therapy expenses for the parties' son, 
Tony, in light of the disparity in the parties' incomes. 
9. It was an abuse of the court's discretion to award Mrs. 
Coelho only the inadequate sum of $3,000 in attorney's fees, when 
her total fees exceeded $10,000, and there was no evidence offered 
at trial to dispute the reasonableness of the fees or Mr. Coelho's 
ability to pay attorney's fees. 
POINT I 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY SUBSTANTIALLY 
RESTRICTING THE TIME ALLOWED FOR TRIAL, WITHOUT NOTICE TO 
THE PARTIES, THEREBY DENYING FLAINTIFF ADEQUATE 
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HER CASE AND CROSS-EXAMINE 
DEFENDANT. 
Inherent in the right to access to the courts, as outlined in 
Article I §§ 7 and 11 of the Constitution of Utah, a party is 
entitled to present its case to the trial court. In this case, 
however, the Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to do so. Due to 
the court's admonitions to counsel as to the limited time available 
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for trial --a total of little more than two (2) hours -- Plaintiff 
was prohibited from calling witnesses she had intended to call; she 
was hurried in her testimony; and she was unable to cross-examine 
the Defendant. 
The parties were scheduled and prepared for a full day of 
trial. Instead, when they arrived, the court advised counsel that 
they would have until noon to present their case because the judge 
had a meeting. The transcript of the trial, which is only 145 
pages long, indicates that the hearing began at 9:20 that morning. 
The first 58 pages of the transcript record the discussions between 
the court and counsel regarding the stipulated issues and the 
issues remaining for trial. The court's time restrictions 
concerned counsel for both parties, and they expressed this concern 
at trial. Presentation of evidence began on page 59 of the 
transcript when Mrs. Coelho took the stand. Mr. Coelho's counsel, 
concerned about the time allocated between the parties, inquired of 
the court: 
Mr. Dart: So that we are measuring our [time] like high 
school debaters are we going to go to 12:00 or 
12:05? 
Judge Young: I am supposed to be in Salt Lake at 12:00, 
which I obviously won't make, so I will let 
you have til 12:00 o'clock. 
Over the remaining pages of the transcript, the court and 
counsel made several references to the time: 
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a) The court stated that certain issues could be dealt with 
by proffer, and it did not "need to hear testimony about them." 
(Tr.p.52, lines 4-7) 
b) The judge admonished Mrs. Coelho's counsel that he was 
"concerned about the allocation of time," and that he did not know 
"whether [the testimony being offered] [was really going to help 
[the court]." (Tr.p.78, lines 6-8) 
c) Mr. Coelho's counsel expressed concern about the time and 
the court notified Mrs. Coelho's counsel that she was "about 
through" and further stated that he " [didn't] know why some of this 
[testimony] could not be stipulated to without laboriously going 
through this [testimony]." (Tr.p. 86, lines 16-22) 
d) The judge told counsel that "[he] did have a problem on 
time. I'm sorry that I have that, but the Chief Justice called a 
meeting." (Tr.p. 86, lines 22-23) 
e) After Mr. Coelho's counsel had cross-examined one of his 
witnesses, the court asked him to advise it as to what he 
"anticipated in [his] last witness in terns of testimony." (Tr. p. 
123, lines 25; p. 124, line 1) 
f) The court stated, at the close of the evidence, that it 
"[had] a couple of options," and asked counsel if they wanted to 
"waive argument" or "come back for about a half an hour argument" 
on the following morning. (Tr.p. 127, lines 23-25) 
g) The judge stated that "the problem that [he] [had] , 
obviously, is pressure on time, and [he] [needed] to both be 
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sensitive to [their] opportunities to be adequately heard and also 
to the pressures that [he had] in terms of commitment to the 
judicial council." (Tr. p. 136, lines 4-8) 
The bottom line is that Mrs. Coelho expected a full day of 
trial and had subpoenaed witnesses to appear on her behalf. When 
the court advised counsel that they had less than two hours to try 
the case, she had only enough time to testify as to very basic 
information and no opportunity to corroborate that testimony 
through her scheduled witnesses. The time restrictions, imposed by 
the court without prior notice to the parties, were arbitrary and 
prejudicial to Mrs. Coelho. 
Mr. Coelho will contend that the trial court "cured" its haste 
when, it its Minute Entry dated April 29, 1993, it invited the 
parties to file their motions for a new trial if the time 
constraints remained "a concern." (R. 330-331). 
In light of the hurried nature of the trial itself, Mrs. 
Coehlo did not believe that she would gain any benefit by filing a 
motion for a new trial and did not pursue that course. In 
addition, with more than $7,000 in attorney's fees and costs that 
the court ordered her to bear, it was economically prohibitive for 
her to consider further proceedings in the lower court. This 
decision was not unreasonable. 
The court also denied Mrs. Coelho adequate access to the court 
when it asked Mr. Coelho's counsel to proffer his testimony, 
thereby prohibiting Mrs. Coelho from cross-examining him and 
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affording no opportunity for the court to judge the credibility of 
his testimony. Taking such evidence by proffer is a violation of 
Rule 43, Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides: 
(a) Form. In all trials, the testimony of witnesses 
shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise 
provided by these rules, the Utah RuLes of Evidence, or 
a statute of this state All evidence shall be admitted 
which is admissible under the Utah Riles of Evidence or 
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. 
(emphasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court had the opportunity to interpret the 
provisions of Rule 43 as it is applied to motions in the case of 
Stan Katz Real Estate Inc. v. Chavez, 565 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1977). 
The court stated: 
We recognize that Rule 43 (e) allows the District Court to 
grant or deny a motion on the sole or combined bases of 
affidavits, depositions or oral testimony. However, when 
no depositions have been taken and disputed material 
facts are alleged in opposing affidavits, there should be 
an evidentiary hearing to aid in the resolution of those 
facts. The reasons for requiring an evidentiary hearing 
under the circumstances were enunciated in Autera v. 
Robinson, 136 U.S. App. D.C. 216, 419 F.2d 1197, 1202 
(1969), as follows: 
'Had no factual dispute arisen to plague the parties' 
substantive rights' we would perceive no difficulty in 
the judge's acceptance as a predicate for his action, of 
the facts represented through statements by members of 
the bar and affidavits of the parties or others. In this 
case, however, despite the factual questions developing 
as the hearing moved along, no opportunity was afforded 
anyone to test any representation by the chastening 
process of cross-examination . . . The opportunity to 
judge credibility was non-existent as to the absent 
affiant; the opportunity to probe by cross-examination 
was completely lacking. Without those twin tools, normal 
in the trial of factual issues, the factual conclusion 
was certain to take on an unaccustomed quality of 
artificiality . . . we recognize, of course, that trial 
judges have a discretion to hear and determine ordinary 
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motions either on affidavits or oral testimony portraying 
facts not appearing of record. We note, however, that an 
attempted resolution of factual disputes on conflicting 
affidavits alone may pose the question whether the 
discretion was properly exercised.' 
565 P. 2d at 1143. (Although the Utah Supreme Court cited Rule 
43(e) and not 43 (b) , the court quoted the provisions of 43(e) in 
footnote no. 2, and it is identical to the current language of Rule 
43(b) .) 
The portion of Rule 43 at issue in the Katz case relating to 
receiving oral testimony in support of motions is discretionary. 
By contrast, the provision applicable to this case, subsection (a) , 
is mandatory. At trial, therefore, it is even more important to 
afford a party the opportunity to test the representations made by 
"the chastening process of cross-examination" and allow the trial 
court an opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses by 
hearing oral testimony. By allowing Mr. Coelho to proffer his 
testimony, the trial court in this case denied Mrs. Coelho the 
opportunity for cross-examination and denied itself the opportunity 
to judge Mr. Coelho's testimony. Therefore, on disputed issues of 
fact, the court's findings and conclusions, in the words of the 
Supreme Court, take on a "quality of artificiality" which 
substantially affected Mrs. Coelho's rights in this action. 
This case should be remanded to the trial court for a new 
trial, consistent with the requirements of Rule 43, and allowing 
Mrs. Coelho adequate time to present her case. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING RELEVANT 
EVIDENCE OFFERED BY PLAINTIFF AND BY ITS REFUSAL TO 
REVIEW DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
One of the primary issues before the court was whether Mr. 
Coelho's 1993 income would be considerably less than his 1992 
income. Mr. Coelho took the position that his 1993 income would be 
substantially less than his 19 92 income due to factors beyond his 
control, but Mrs. Coelho argued that he was simply "posturing" in 
anticipation of trial. To establish that Mr. Coelho was in fact 
capable of earning at or in excess of his historical level, Mrs. 
Coelho attempted to introduce certain evidence at trial that would 
substantiate the building activity that had been occurring in both 
Park City and Summit County. This evidence included summaries of 
records of building permits recently issued in Park City and Summit 
County. Mr. Coelho objected on the basis of relevance, and the 
court sustained the objection and stated: 
Judge Young: Well, I can't even begin to believe that 
I would be making a decision on the basis 
of the building permits that are offered 
in Park City. There are so many variables 
as to whether those building permits are 
comparable, whether he could do that kind 
of work, whether he is the one that solely 
gets a building permit. There are just too 
many variables for me to make a decision on 
that basis. 
Ms. Saunders: Okay. My only point in showing it, 
irrespective of how the court rules, and 
this is for the record, it is to show if 
Mr. Coelho claims there is no work available 
in Summit County or Park City that there is 
certainly a great amount of activity that 
goes on, and whether he qualified under it 
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or not there's still work there. 
(Tr.p. 92, lines 16 through p. 93, line 5) 
It was error to exclude this evidence on the basis of 
relevance. Pursuant to Rule 4 01 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
"relevant evidence" is defined as "evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable then it 
would be without the evidence. The issue of whether or not Mr. 
Coelho was voluntarily underemployed was of serious consequence to 
Mrs. Coelho as it affected the financial support awarded by the 
court and the allocation of debt. Given the fact that Mr. Coelho 
was in the construction business, evidence that work was available 
made it more probable that he was voluntarily unemployed. It was 
therefore relevant and its exclusion was prejudicial error. 
In addition, the offer of the evidence was in the nature of a 
request for the court to take judicial notice of public records. 
Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, it is the duty 
of the court to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts. Under 
that rule, "a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of 
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." It is mandatory for the 
court to take judicial notice "if requested by a party and supplied 
with the necessary information." 
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The documents that Mrs. Coelho's counsel wanted to admit were 
public records and therefore their accuracy could not reasonably be 
questioned. Because of Mr. Coelho's claim that work was 
unavailable, the evidence was relevant. The weight the court 
desired to give to that evidence was within its discretion, but 
refusing to admit it was prejudicial error because the court 
subsequently accepted Mr. Coelho's proffer as to earnings and 
speculated that his income for 1993 would oe less than 1992. There 
was no basis, either in the transcript or the record, on which to 
justify such speculation. In contrast, the evidence offered would 
have contradicted Mr. Coelho's position that he was underemployed 
because there was no work available. 
In addition to the court's failure to admit relevant evidence, 
the court expressly refused to review evidence that had been 
admitted. Mrs. Coelho's counsel offered copies of the parties' tax 
returns and other financial documentation which were admitted into 
evidence. (See Exhibits 2 through 10 and Exhibit 16) At the close 
of Mr. Coelho's case, his counsel advised the court that he would 
agree to waive closing argument if Mrs. Coelho's counsel would as 
well. Her counsel indicated that she would do so because she 
thought the "paper work," referring to the tax returns and other 
exhibits she had submitted, would "help [the court] out," and the 
court responded: 
Well, I'm prepared to rule right now. I don't 
think you can expect that I am going to go through 
the backup documents and the checks and the tax 
returns and the other documents. 
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(Tr.p. 128, lines 13-16) 
It is the duty of the court to listen to the testimony of 
witnesses, to review the documentary evidence admitted, and to 
render a decision after its consideration of all of the evidence 
and testimony adduced at trial. Any other procedure, even in the 
interests of time, is arbitrary, without support in fact or law, 
and an abuse of discretion. The findings relating to Mr. Coelho's 
income are not supported by the evidence, and this case should be 
remanded for a new trial and an adequate consideration of the 
evidence. 
POINT III 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE PARTIES' GROSS 
MONTHLY INCOMES TO THE PLAINTIFF WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND RESULTED IN AN 
INADEQUATE AWARD OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT 
Despite the fact that the uncontroverted evidence at trial 
established that Mrs. Coehlo's monthly net income averaged 
$1,121.54 and her monthly expenses were $3,560.00, and despite the 
fact that, since 1989, Mr. Coehlo's earnings averaged $6,597.92 per 
month, the court only awarded Mrs. Coehlo alimony in the amount of 
$1,000 per month for one year and child support in the amount of 
$619 per month. The court's findings as to the income of the 
parties, the awards of child support and alimony are as follows: 
8. Income Determination. The court heard 
testimony from plaintiff concerning her income history 
and capacity to earn income, testimony from two 
accountants concerning the parties' historical income and 
defendant's income for 1992, a proffer concerning 
defendant's current earning capacity, and copies of the 
parties' tax returns for the past ten years together with 
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summaries. The court having reviewed and considered all 
the evidence, finds that based upon the current 
circumstances defendant has an earning capacity of $5,000 
per month and plaintiff has an earning capacity of $1,500 
per month, and the court's findings related to support 
and alimony are based upon these income expectancies. 
Specifically, the court finds that defendant is 
a small independent contractor who has had good years and 
bad years. It appears that 1992 was a good year but the 
income related primarily to one project, and it further 
appears that defendant earned most of the 1992 income 
during the first part of the year, with very little 
income for the last part of the year and with no income 
for the first month of 1993. It is because of these 
circumstances that the court finds the expectancy for 
1993 of defendant's income is the amount of $5,000 per 
month. 
Specifically, the court finds that plaintiff is 
currently working at employment as a ski instructor and 
working with disabled children, earning an income 
substantially below what she has historically earned when 
she was active as a real estate person during the 1985, 
1986, 1987 and 1988 years, as reflected in plaintiff's 
own Exhibit 11. It is anticipated that plaintiff should 
be able to become more gainfully employed and after a 
short period of time earn an income sufficient to meet 
her own needs based upon her demonstrated ability. 
9. Child Support. Consistent with the Child 
Support Guidelines of the State of Utah, the income 
determinations set forth in paragraph 8, and the custody 
arrangement between the parties as sec forth in paragraph 
4 above, defendant should pay to plaintiff as child 
support the sum of $619 per month, commencing with the 
month of February, 1993, as shown on the Child Support 
Worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit "A" . As a further 
obligation of support, defendant should be responsible to 
maintain the children on his currently-held health and 
accident insurance which has a $500 deductible and each 
of the parties should be responsible for one-half of all 
non-insured medical expenses incurred by any of the three 
children. 
Defendant should have the further obligation to 
pay to plaintiff one-half of any child care costs which 
she incurs which are work related Plaintiff shall 
provide to defendant an accounting at the end of the 
month of the time and cost of child care. Defendant 
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should then pay to plaintiff one-half of S C J 
within ten days of receipt of the accounting. 
The court finds that Tony is currently in need 
of therapy, and to the extent that expenses are incurred 
for necessary therapy as that necessity is indicated by 
his therapist, the cost of this therapy should be paid 
70% by defendant and 30% by plaintiff. This proration is 
roughly equatable to the proration of income between the 
parties and, further, takes into consideration the fact 
that plaintiff should have some substantial 
responsibility for the cost of therapy as she has control 
of determining how often therapy is received. 
The parties have stipulated that Sara should be 
seen by a mutually-acceptable therapist on the basis of 
once a month and in the event of any opinion of the 
therapist that more therapy is required, then as often as 
necessary, with each of the parties to be responsible for 
one-half of the therapy. The choice of a mutually-
acceptable therapist for Sara should be determined by the 
parties in consultation with Dr. Sam Goldstein. Any 
therapy for Sara with Michelle Miller should be paid by 
defendant. The division of this cost equally between the 
parties is different than the division related to Tony's 
therapy for the reason that defendant shall be 
responsible for all of the costs of Michelle Miller, who 
is the current therapist for Sara. 
Any obligation for payment of support or 
medical or therapy expenses shall continue so long as the 
children are minors and thereafter to high school 
graduation for any child who turns 18 prior to 
graduation. 
11, Alimony. Based upon the findings which the 
court has previously set forth above and based upon the 
living expenses of the parties as set forth in their 
respective exhibits, defendant should pay to plaintiff as 
alimony the sum of $1,000 a month commencing with the 
month of February, 1993, and continuing for a period of 
one year to allow plaintiff the opportunity to 
reestablish her income based upon her demonstrated 
historical earning capacity. At that time, plaintiff 
should have the right to petition the court for a 
reevaluation to determine whether alimony should be 
terminated at that time or extended based upon the 
circumstances then existing. 
(R.I : • 3 1:0 3 1 4) . " 
2 :i 
These findings are clearly erroneoas because they are not 
supported by the evidence at trial. The financial support awarded 
to the Plaintiff, based on these findings, was an abuse of 
discretion. 
A. Financial Circumstances 
The evidence at trial established that Mrs. Coelho was working 
two jobs, one as a ski instructor which was seasonal and another as 
a trainer working with handicapped adults. In addition, she was 
also attending school full-time. Her average net monthly income was 
$1,121.54. Mrs. Coelho also testified that she had worked as a real 
estate agent and that during 1985 she had made a very large 
commission from one sale. Excluding that year, Mrs. Coelho 
averaged approximately $25,000 per year of net income (after 
necessary business expenses) from her real estate earnings which 
included a $10,000 annual payment for two (2) years that was 
deferred from the very same sale. From 1989 through 1991, her net 
income from real estate earnings averaged less than $3,000 per 
year, and she did not work in real estate after 1991. She also 
testified that she was no longer licensed as a real estate agent, 
and estimated that it would take her the average length of time, 
about five years, to build up a clientele. She also testified that 
the parties' handicapped son, Tony, demanded much of her time and 
attention, thereby making a reentry into tne real estate profession 
impractical. In fact, the court had previously awarded Mr. Coelho 
$2,600 per month as combined temporary support. (R. 43-51) 
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could earn $1,500 per month and admonished her to "maximize" her 
earning potential, The court purported t D rely on the fact that 
si le 1 lad :i i I the past, and specifically that one year in which she 
earned the large commission, demonstrated an ability to earn 
sufficiently more than she was making at the time < : f t: : :i a] , 
Contrary to the court's use of years and years of historical 
earnings to artificially increase Mrs. Coelho's earnings, or at 
] e a s t: h e r e a :i : i :i :i n g a 1: :i ] :i t y t h e :: c i i r t i : e f i i s e d t • : :: c • n s i d e i I I :i : 
Coelho's historical earnings, even for the three years prior to 
trial . nstead, the court imputed income to him based only on his 
:•- •• -:---r. ~ - :: 0 
during 199 J. . .\..-, was simpiy speculation ana not based on -,ny i.ard 
evidence heard an tria. Instead, rhe evidence ar r ri Ri ^learly 
- ; ; n 
contractor, and since 1989 his income, after necessary and 
discretionary business expenses, averaged $6,594.92 per month. His 
a v er age i noi ltl LI y ear i iii igs f : :i : 1 9 92 , tl le } ea .: : ti lat: ei ided less than 
two months before the time of trial were $7,281.17. 
Because her husband's earnings fluctuated over the course of 
t: I: i e ;\, e a :i : , ; ; :i 1:1 l s o i: i: i e i i: i c • i 1 1 : 1 i s b e 1 n g v e r y g o o d a i l d o 11 i e r s less s c •, :i t 
was Mrs. Coelho's position at trial that it would be fair to 
average his earnings, She requested the court '-- find that Mr. 
Coe 11 i i) • s g:r o s s n IOI 11:1 i] ;\, r ii ICoi: i le /v a s $ 6 , 5 0 0 , L- v e:. .--ss i han t he 
monthly average for 1992, and to base its support awards on that 
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amount. The evidence supporting Mrs. Coelho's position included 
the parties' tax returns and evidence of Mr. Coelho's historical 
earnings was undisputed at trial. Despite the undisputed evidence, 
however, the court chose to arbitrarily set Mr. Coelho's income at 
the speculative amount of $5,000, based only on the proffer of his 
counsel. The court's determinations were clearly erroneous, not 
based on law or fact, and unsupported by the evidence. Because of 
their adverse impact on both the child support and alimony amounts 
awarded to Mrs. Coelho, the findings should be vacated and this 
case remanded to the trial court for a determination of appropriate 
findings on which to base an adequate award of child support and 
alimony. 
B. Child Support 
Under Utah Code Ann., § 78-45-7.5(5) (Supp. 1993), the trial 
courts are required to verify the incomes of the parties to 
calculate child support. In pertinent part, this section states: 
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable 
documentation of current earnings, including year-
to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each 
parent shall supplement documentation of current 
earnings with copies of tax returns from at least 
the most recent year to provide verification of 
earnings over time and shall dccument income from 
nonearned sources according to the source. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used 
to determine whether an underemployment or over 
employment situation exists. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This section clearly requires the court to base its award of 
support on the current earnings of the parties. If current 
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situation of underemployment or overemployment exists, then and 
only then can i t review the historical earnings of the parties. 
Ap p 1 y i i i g t: 1 l e s e p i o < i s i o i i s t: • : t: 1 I e f a c t s c • f 11: i i s :: a s e . ...: I e r e ' s 
no finding that Mr. Coehlo was overemployed or that Mr. Coehlo was 
underemployed. In fact evidence would simply not support such 
f i i i d :i i i g s 11 I s t. e a • :i t: 1 i e B < ? :i :i e i I c e b e f o r e t h e cour t c 1 e a r 1 y 
establishes that Mrs. Coehlo's current gross monthly income was 
$1,121.45, and Mr. Coelho's average net monthly for 1992, based his 
net gross of ^[Jbt^4bf (after reduction for necessary and 
discretionary business expenses), was $7,945.50. Based en these 
incomes, the court was compelled by ' ' ' "' :o 
child support i n the sum of $937. The court's failure to do so was 
clearly erroneous. This court should either enter its own order of 
ch:i ] d si ippoi: t r eti oacti remand t Y\c- is< t o 
the trial coui t: for a determination consistent with this court's 
ruling. 
I n a d d i t: :i : • i I t: I: i e e r r o n e o u s f i n d :i i i g s i: e s i i ] t: e d :i i i a i i i i i e q i i i t a b 1 e 
division of responsibility for extraordinary expenses incurred for 
the parties' son, Tony. ' ri id s court should enter its order 
r e q u i r i n g t h E p a r t i E s t • : b e i : e s p o n s i b ] e f D :I : a p r o p o r t :i D i I a t e s h a. r e 
of Tony's expenses after an appropriate determination of the 
parties' incomes. 
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C. Alimony 
The same error that skewed the child support calculations also 
adversely affected the amount of the alimony awarded to Mrs. 
Coelho. Based on the court's analysis of the incomes of the 
parties, and its speculation as to her future earnings, it only 
awarded Mrs. Coelho alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month for 
a period of one year. This was clearly an abuse of the court's 
discretion and not based on the evidence adduced at trial. 
The factors the court should have considered when making an 
award of alimony are well-settled in Utah law. In awarding alimony 
the court was required to consider: 
1. The financial condition and needs of the 
party seeking alimony; 
2. That party's ability to produce sufficient 
income for him or herself; and 
3. The ability of the other party to provide support. 
See Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah App. 1990); Naranio v. 
Naranio, 751 P. 2d 1144, 1147 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Watson v. 
Watson, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 43 (1992). 
This court has also held that the " [f]ailure to analyze the 
parties' circumstances in the light cf these three factors 
constitutes an abuse of discretion." Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P. 2d 
at 1147 (Utah App. 1988). 
Applying these factors to the case on appeal, the court 
clearly abused its discretion in fashioning a support award for 
Mrs. Coelho. First of all, evidence at trial established that Mrs. 
Coelho's monthly living expenses were $3,560.00 (see Exhibit 14) 
26 
a i 1 c:i 1 1 • :=:! ] : a v e r a g E i n i) i 11:1 i ] y i :i a t :i i I c o m e , a s $ 2 I! 2.] 4 5 T h a :i : e ; ; a s i i o 
evidence introduced at trial to contradict these expenses. There 
are only two references to Mrs. Coelho's needs in the Findings of 
Fact 11 I I 'ai agraph 8 th E : ' : i n : t f:l nds ti lat I1"" !i s Coell 10 si lould 
after a short period of time earn an income sufficient to meet 
her own needs based upon her demonstrated ability." In Paragraph 
1 3 , the court accepts the ] i ving expenses of the parties as "set 
forth in their respective exhibits." Based on .Mrs. Coehlo's income 
at time of trial, Exhibit I D illustrates the monthly short fa ] ] she 
experiences between those expenses and her income, the amount of 
$2,438.46. It is simply inconceivable that Mrs. Coelho could meet 
thd s short fa ] ] e^ ren i tl :i :i i l c r e a s e d : 1 ] :i 1! I si lpp c •] : t: ; a 
sufficient alimony award. 
The second factor the court must consider in making a 
detei nii nat:i :>i i : f ai l awai d : f a ] :i mon^ :ii s the 5 J: :i ] :ii tr\, • : : ..g 
spouse to produce a sufficient income for herself. It was 
undisputed at. trial that Mrs. Coehlo was earning an average net 
:i ncc n le of $11 1i 2] 15 j: ei n: i DI ltl l woi ] d i ig b; /c j obs 
Coelho testified that she left the real estate business because of 
the increased needs of her family and specifically the needs of her 
• :: I i i 1 d :i : e i i., t i I e :: ::»i: i :i : t: :i nip r o p e :i : J y s p e c u 1 a t e d t: h a t s 1 l e c o u 1 :i ' ' i i: L a : : :i i t i :i z e "' 
her earnings and imputed income to her that she did not earn in 
analyzing her ability to produce income. In its findings the court 
stated: 
The court finds that [Mrs. Coelho] is currently 
working at employment as a [ski] instructor and 
working with disabled children, earning an income 
substantially below what she has historically 
earned when she was active as a real estate sales 
person during the 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 years, 
as reflected in plaintiff's own Exhibit 11. It is 
anticipated that [Mrs. Coelho] should be able to 
become more gainfully employed and after a short 
period of time earn an income sufficient to meet 
her own needs based upon her demonstrated ability. 
(Finding No. 8; R.340; emphasis added) 
Even in the court's own finding, it acknowledges that 
Mrs. Coelho's real estate earning history ended in 1988, five years 
before the trial. Therefore, it was error for the court to even 
consider it in determining Mrs. Coelho's ability to provide for her 
own financial needs. However, even if she did have the ability to 
earn income at the court's level of $1,50 3 per month, it is clear 
that she cannot maintain herself and the children in the standard 
of living to which the family became accustomed during the marriage 
without an appropriate amount of alimony in excess of that awarded 
by the court. 
Finally, the court must consider the ability of the defendant, 
Mr. Coelho, to pay alimony. In this regard, the court erred in two 
respects. First of all, the court erred in disregarding his actual 
earnings to reach its determination that his average monthly income 
was $5,000. Instead, evidence at trial established that he had net 
earnings of $95,346 in 1992. The only evidence at trial as to Mr. 
Coehlo's future earnings was the proffer made by Mr. Coehlo's 
counsel that he "expected" to earn no more than $60,000 in 1993. 
Again, by accepting this proffer despite substantial evidence to 
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into the future to reduce his average earnings. At the same time, 
the court put Mrs. Coelho a^~ =* disadvantage by using income figures 
;: 11 t:i fi cia 11 y increase her expected 
earnings. 
Second, the court erred hv -iccertir. : Mr. '"'oehlo's month] y 
li v :ii i ig expenses as listed .:: a u _xnii:i: 25. Several of his 
expenses are excessive almost as a matter of law. Unfortunately, 
Mrs . Coelho' a counsel was not given the time to « la : oss exan a i ie I Ii: 
Coelho about the furniture replacement expense 
($400.00 -.he professional services expense ($500.00), and his 
entertainm^r* pense ($400 00 ) , : :i : if: : 22 : : 'SS exan i:i 1: ie 1 :i :i t 1: 1 a s to 
whether many of those expenses, e.g., automobile, health insurance, 
and entertainment, were paid by his business before he received his 
in-1 < \~u'n 1 nqs "Tl ie tax reti irns and spec,] f i cal ly Schedul e C of the 
returns, would so indicate. Throughout the trial Mrs. Coelho's 
counsel had been cautioned to be brief, to hurry through her 
c ] i e 1:11:' s c a s e , a 1 1 d 1 1 e 1 :i 1: 1 a b :i ] i t: \, t o c 2: o s s e: : a m :i 1: 1 e I I :i : C • :: e ] 1 1 :: • a: a s 1: 1 o 
exception, as is illustrated by the following exchange that took 
place between the court and counsel: 
Ms. Saunders: And the other thing I didn't get 
to talk to Mr. Coelho about and I would have 
asked on cross-examination is why, why for one 
man [are] his monthly expenses $3,900 a month 
and my client's [are] $400.00 less a month and 
she had the three children, the mortgage 
payment and herself to support. That's 
outrageous. I mean, if he is paying $4,000 a 
month for one person, for himself, that's a 
,;: 9 
high standard of living when thiee children, a 
house and a mother are less. 
Mr. Dart: I can [respond] to everything 
that's been said if the court's interested in 
hearing it. 
Judge Young: Yes, but the problem I have, 
obviously, is pressure on time, and I need to 
both be sensitive to your opportunities to be 
adequately heard and also to the pressures 
that I have in terms of commitment to the 
judicial council. 
It is clear that Mr. Coelho's expenses, particularly when 
compared to his wife's expenses for herself and two children, were 
excessive and not representative of his actual expenses. Instead, 
it is clear from the evidence at trial that Mr. Coelho had the 
ability to pay alimony in an amount that would provide Mrs. Coelho 
and the children a standard of living comparable to his own. Under 
these circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion to award Mrs. 
Coehlo alimony of only $1,000.00 per month. 
Finally, the court clearly erred as a matter of law by 
limiting the award of alimony to a period of one year. The parties 
were married for sixteen years. Where a marriage is of long 
duration and the earning capacity of one spouse greatly exceeds 
that of the other, an alimony award is made to insure that the 
supported spouse may maintain a standard of living that would have 
been enjoyed had the marriage continued. (See Naranio, at 1147; 
See also Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Utah App. 1988) . 
There are neither such findings in this case nor any evidence which 
would support such findings. Clearly, Mrs. Coelho will be unable 
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 * ILJUMII t.li standard t I irTiii-j enjoyed dining the marriage with 
the inadequate and limited alimony awarded by the trial court. 
The parties' historical abilities and present abilities to 
eai i ] :i i icoi i: Le vi ei s significai 11:] y and substantially disparate. The 
evidence of Mrs. Coelho's needs was undisputed. It was clear that 
she could not meet those needs without substantia] f i nanc i ail 
suppoi t f i om I Ir Coell 10 . Finally, it was clear from the evidence 
that Mr. Coelho had an ability to provide sufficient support. 
Based on the evidence in the record tl :i :i , 3 • ::oi 1:1 : t , sh : 1 LI I re^ ^ erse 
the lower court's award of alimony and enter :i ts own order awarding 
Mrs. Coelho alimony, retroactive to the date of trial, :r ~he 
amount she requested of $2 , 5 0 0 p e 1 1 noi 11h (T1 : , p , 2 ] , ] :i 1 1 es 
which should continue until she remarries, cohabits, 01 :i:--s, 
whichever shall first occur. In the alternative, the case should 
lit-"* n'MTiandpd f 1 > 1 1111 ippropr i ate d^t prm i r 1 • 11 i'Mii 11I alnnuij/. 
POINT I J 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING PLAINTIFF 
TO PAY ONE-HALF OF THE TOTAL EQUITY LINE MORTGAGE 
AND ONE-HALF OF THE TAX OBLIGATION OWING TO THE IRS 
11: 1 t:he Decree of D:i vo 1: ::• E t:he cc 1 11 t Drdered M1 s . Coe1 11 o to pay 
one-half of the total equity line second mortgage owing on the 
parties' residence in the amount of $34,400, despite the fact that 
appro x i m a t e .1 } r $ 7 0 0 0 • :: • f 1 1 1 • a b a 1 a n c e o w i 1 1 g w a s u s e d 1: •} i • : • t o 
pay his temporary support obligations. Finally, the court ordered 
Mrs. Coehlo to pay one-half of the parties' tax obligation to the 
IRS : 1 1 11 1 e bas:i s 11: 1 at t:I: 1 e y 1 1 ad bot: 1 1 de 1 i « ed a benefit from the 
money during the marriage, despite the fact that the parties had 
not lived together during the entire year. Mr. Coehlo's ability to 
pay that tax was substantially better than Mrs. Coehlo's, and his 
income comprised a much greater percentage of the whole income upon 
which taxes were due. 
The findings in support of the court's decisions state, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
5. Real Property. The house and real 
property located at 5328 Old Ranch Road, Park 
City, Utah, should be listed for sale with a 
real estate agent mutually acceptable to the 
parties, and a listing price to be arrived at 
between the parties in consultation with said 
real estate agent. Upon the sale of said 
house and real property, and after payment of 
the first mortgage obligation to Valley 
National Mortgage Co. which has a current 
balance of $137,000, the second mortgage line-
of-credit to Valley Bank which [has] a current 
balance of $34,400, expenses of sale and any 
out-of-pocket expenses of either party 
necessary to place the home in marketable 
condition, and any moving expenses of 
plaintiff up to the amount of $5,000, any 
remaining equity should be divided equally 
between the parties.... 
7. Debts and Obligations. The liabilities of 
the parties should be assumed and paid as 
follows: 
(a) The first and second mortgages 
on the home at 5328 Old Ranch Road, 
Park City, should be assumed and 
paid as set forth in Paragraph 5 
above. 
(b) The 1992 income tax liability 
of the parties should be divided 
equally between the parties, and the 
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parties should cooperate with their 
accountant, E.J. Passey, in the 
preparation of income tax returns 
either jointly or separately which 
will provide the lowest total tax 
liability. Defendant should be 
responsible for and pay for the cost 
of this tax preparation. 
(i-1 , -\Ah ~34U>) 
While the trial court is given broad discretion to allocate 
responsibility for marital debt between the p ai rties, (see Sinclair 
v. Sinclair, . •• •.. .Jet. ::e court abused its 
discretion i:: this case, ' :: -.r about October 15, 1991, the court 
entered its temporary ~rder vwa^-i" :"i v ' ~- :. ) "fan si lpp <: i : t" 
in the amount ^f $2,6CG per montn. !R. i •• Approximately one year 
later, on or about November 20, 1992. the Defendant made a motion 
t o b e a I ] < ~ • A- - • • - •' • r t g a g e t: : s a t i s f y 
this support w^iigation, •" ..- basis for his motion was 
his claim that he had finished the construction projects upon which 
th^ 1 rTnporaiy M M I I I »\M - I i nl MIM nun ii'ipat* I having in employment 
until the spring. (R 11 7-119) 
Mrs. Coelho objected, citing her argument that: Mr, Coelho was 
v o ] i i n t: a r :i ] y a i I • :i :i n t e n t i o n a 1 ] y \ 11 i d e i: e i n p 1 o y e d . T : 31,1 p p o 1 t her 
position, she relied on the tax returns of the parties, amounts in 
Mr. Coelho's bank accounts, his historical employment history, work 
availabl e ,i n Park rM + " ,M I 1 L "UIUPI ai; I "int 1 11^  I t ipj, Mi , jelho 
had recently taken out of state. (I 12 9-139) The court granted 
the motion, reserving the issue of responsibility to pay back the 
a m o 1.1 n is s :i 1: 1 c 1; 11: 1: e :I 1 11: 11: :i ] t :i 1 1: 1 e :> £ t: 1 i a ] (1 1 2 ; 3 a n d. 2 81-282) . 
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After ruling on the primary issues on the date of trial, the 
court asked counsel if there were "anything else unresolved," (T. 
14 0, 1. 25) and counsel and the court subsequently had the 
following exchange: 
Ms. Saunders: The second mortgage, the line 
of credit, we had not discussed. 
Judge Young: That's considered by the court 
to be a marital [debt] and that's considered 
to be the joint responsibility of the parties. 
So what'11 happen is that'll simply be paid 
off out of the proceeds of the sale of the 
home. 
Ms. Saunders: What if the house isn't sold? 
Judge Young: Then it remains as an expense 
against the mortgage. Against the property. 
It is a marital expense. In other words, they 
can resolve how they are going to deal with 
that marital expense, but it is a joint 
marital expense and it goes against the asset 
value. 
Ms. Saunders: Even it part of it was used 
to pay the alimony? 
Judge Young: It was used to pay alimony 
because of the loss of income. 
Mr. Dart: Finally, there is an issue, I 
suppose, at least I've heard it, that the 1992 
tax liability, whatever it is, is going to be 
for $15,000.00, $20,000.00. Our position is 
it is marital and should be divided. 
Judge Young: It is a marital expense and it 
should be divided. 
(T. 141, lines 1-25) 
The court was required to make specific findings to support 
its determination allocating these obligations equally between the 
parties. In neither the transcript of the trial nor the findings 
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subsequent 1 / ^ utei^d I , I L> ui " i > I here any specific explanation 
as to why the court ruled as it did. Instead, the court simply and 
arbitrarily concluded that the credit line expense and ~:~ * = •  •'--; -
wei e i i: iai: i t:a 1 expei ises. 
Based :>i I 1 lis proffer at trial and based on the evidence 
submitted to the court, Mr. Coelho clearly 1 M S HI* IIPHI'PT RbLin. / 
to pay the credit line expense and tax debt. 
To begin first with the credit line expense, Mr. Coelho should 
have been required * " . .. i 
weight of evidence established that he was intentionally unemployed 
in anticipation of trial. Clearly, a i nan who averaged $6,500 per 
m o n t h s :i n c e 1 9 8 9 i i D i :i ] d i l • : t: 1: e t: o t a ] ] \ \ \ :i t: 1 i ::> i 1 1 ; \,i D r ] : : i £ i 11 I d s t: : i i: i e e t: 
his obligations. At the very least, the court should have accepted 
evidence on this issue. 
instructions a^ \^ the appropriate division :^ r chis debt after a 
determination as to whether Mr. Coelho was voluntary and 
i n t e n t i o n a 1 ] y i 11 i d a i : e mp 1 o y e d 
Second, the court abused its discretion by ordering each party 
to pay one half of the 1992 tax debt. The parties separated in the 
Fal ] : f 1 9 911 a .i l :i 1 :i ? E I a ipai : t: :ii n : i i l g I::l: le entire 19 92 tax year . 
Contrary to the general premise that both parties benefitted from 
the monies not paid for taxes, Mrs. Coelho received only the 
temporary suppoi: t ai i: ic I 11 11: I" I:i : C• : e ] 1 i :: ; * as Di: dered to pay during the 
entire year. Therefore, regardless of whether Mr. Coelho paid his 
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taxes or whether he used the money for other expenditures, Mrs. 
Coelho did not benefit from that decision, The court's ruling, in 
fact, penalized her, making her responsible where she had no input 
in the decision not to pay taxes and where that money had been 
available only to Mr. Coelho to meet his obligations. 
Instead, the evidence is clear that Mr. Coelho had the much 
greater financial ability to pay the taxes and at the very least 
the court should have apportioned responsibility for the debt based 
on each party's proportionate share of the income earned. 
Splitting responsibility for the debt was an abuse of discretion 
and Mr. Coelho should be ordered by this court to pay in full the 
IRS obligation or at least the greater proportionate share of it. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ONLY AWARDING MRS. 
COELHO $3,000 IN ATTORNEY'S FEES AND IN FAILING TO MAKE 
THE REQUISITE FINDINGS UPON WHICH TO BASE AN AWARD. 
Trial courts have the power to award attorney's fees in 
divorce proceedings pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 3 0-3-3 (Supp. 
1993). While the decision to make an award and the amount of the 
award are within the sound discretion of the trial court, an award 
of attorney's fees must be based upon the need of the receiving 
spouse, the ability of the paying spouse to pay such fees and the 
reasonableness of the fees. An award of attorney's fees must be 
supported by adequate findings. As outlined in the case of Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P.2d 494 (Utah App. 1991): 
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A trial court has the power to award attorney's fees in 
divorce proceedings, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 3 0-3-3 
(198 9) . The award must be based upon evidence of the 
financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of 
the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
requested fees. The decision to make such an award and 
the amount thereof rests primarily in the sound 
discretion of the trial court. A court may consider, 
among other factors, the difficulty of the litigation, 
the efficiency of the attorneys, the reasonableness of 
the number of hours spent on the case, the fees 
customarily charged in the locality, the amount involved 
in the case and the result obtained, and the expertise 
and experience of the attorneys involved. 
i d ,il I'M '. 
In the Bell case, the Plaintiff presented evidence that her 
reasonable attorney' s fees were $2,350 , a nd the Defendant :i :i • :i i ic -t 
challenge the reasonableness of the fees. Even so, the trial court 
awarded the plaintiff only $800 and made no findings relating to 
the three factors or any explanation f^r .-unfiling ai' / ' iif t hj.rd '<f 
the requested fees. Thi s court remanded the case to the trial 
court for a redetermination of attorney's fees and findings to 
support iw-ii'l Fin ,II 'I'Mii'i, t 1! i I M-li'"'i| i'ii Haumont v, 
Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 tULali App. 1990) in which this court held 
that it was an abuse of discretion for a trial court to award less 
t h a n t• h P amowrit" of a 1 1 o r n e y ' a f : ^ e s < • I a Lin*•• •;' i absei 11: a i easoi iable 
justification. (See 810 P.2d at 494) 
These principles are directly applicable to the attorney's 
fees awa rde d t: 1 Ie i: • 1 a i nt: :i f f :i i I t: 1 i :i s :: as e \ \ t: 1 1 l e 1: :i i t: le o f t r i a 1, 
counsel for the Plaintiff proffered testimony relating to the 
attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff as well as submitting an 
a f f i da v i t (S e e I ] a i i I t: :i f f i E x h i b., i 1 1 9 ) T :> ] :;»e g i n w i t h, t he 
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parties stipulated that the fees charged by the Plaintiff's prior 
attorney, Mary Corporon, in the amount of $946.57 were reasonable. 
(Tr.p. 90 lines 11-15) After that stipulation was submitted to the 
court, Evelyn Saunders testified that her fees, which she believed 
were reasonable, totalled $9,164, not including amounts incurred on 
the date of trial. (Tr.p. 90, line 21 through p. 92 and line 6; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 19) 
Despite the fact that this evidence was uncontested and 
despite the fact that the defendant did not object to the 
reasonableness of the fees or deny his ability to pay, the trial 
court simply ruled "now, as to attorney's fees, he is to pay $3,000 
of her attorney's fees and otherwise each is to bear their own." 
(Tr.p. 140, lines 5-7) The only finding which supports this award 
is finding number 13. It states: 
13. Attorney's Fees and Costs. Plaintiff 
proffered evidence of attorney's fees which she had 
incurred with her prior attorney Mary Corporon and with 
her present attorney Evelyn R. Saunders and the court 
having considered the reasonableness of the fees and the 
relative ability of the parties to meet the cost of 
attorney's fees and taking into consideration that the 
Defendant shall be responsible for all of his own fees, 
finds that it is reasonable that Defendant should be 
responsible for payment of $3,000 to Plaintiff for her 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action, which 
amount should be paid within 12 0 days from the 11th day 
of February, 1993 or upon sale of the house and real 
property of the parties, whichever occurs first. 
This finding is insufficient to satisfy the requirements 
outlined by this court. Specifically, the trial court failed to 
make a finding as to the Plaintiff's need for payment of her fees 
and the Defendant's ability to pay those fees. As argued above, the 
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incomes of the parties' incomes were greatly disparate, and the 
only justification for reducing the attorney's fees from the amount 
requested was the statement that the Defendant would be responsible 
for all of his own attorney's fees. However, the court made 
absolutely no finding nor is there any evidence in the record as to 
the Defendant's fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
Because the amount and reasonableness of the fees claimed by 
Mrs. Coelho were undisputed and because there was no evidence 
before the court which would support any reasonable justification 
for the court's decision to award Mrs. Coelho less than all of her 
fees claimed, the award of attorney's fees and costs to Mrs. Coelho 
clearly was an abuse of discretion. This case should be remanded 
to the trial court with instructions to make findings with respect 
to Mrs. Coelho's financial need for her attorney's fees, Mr. 
Coelho's ability to pay her fees, and the reasonableness of the 
fees incurred. In addition, if Mrs. Coelho is awarded less than 
her undisputed claim for fees, additional findings must be made as 
to a reasonable justification for that award. 
CONCLUSION 
The court's arbitrary imposition of time limits prevented Mrs. 
Coelho from having her day in court. As a consequence, relevant 
evidence was excluded and the court's summary consideration of the 
evidence admitted resulted in findings that are clearly erroneous. 
Based on those findings, the court abused its discretion in 
fashioning alimony and child support awards, in allocating debt and 
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in awarding attorneys fees. Where the evidence is clear, this 
court should simply enter its own orders consistent with the actual 
circumstances of the parties at the time of trial. As to the 
remaining issues, this case should be remanded to afford Mrs. 
Coelho the opportunity to fully present her case and for an 
appropriate determination of the facts. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \2J^ day of November, 1993. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
30-3-1 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
30-3-1. Procedure — Residence — Ground 
s. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Irreconcilable differences. 
Jurisdiction, district courts. 
I r r e c o n c i l a b l e differences . 
Because Subsection (3)(h) does not set forth a 
specific fault of the defendant, in contrast to 
the other subsections, it can be inferred that 
Subsection (3)(h), unlike the other provisions, 
is intended to be a no-fault provision. There-
fore, no fault need be proven to apply Sub^r 
tion (3)(h). Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P 2 d ^ i " 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). M 4 2 1 
Jurisdiction, district courts. 
When purported marriage is void ab initio 
under * 30-1-2, a trial court lacks subject ma 
ter jurisdiction to enter a divorce decree Van 
1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — No-Fault 
Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 79. 
A.L.R. — Insanity as defense to divorce or 
separation suit — post-1950 cases, 67 
A.L.R.4th 277. 
Divorce and separation: effect of court order 
prohibiting sale or transfer of property on 
party's right to change beneficiary of insurance 
policy, 68 A.L.R.4th 929. 
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Tem-
porary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to 
establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division of 
property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, 
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other 
party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order 
may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs 
and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed 
upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or 
enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to 
provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support 
and maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the 
other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order 
or judgment. 
His tory : C. 1953, 30-3-3, e n a c t e d by L. 
1993, ch . 137, § 1. 
R e p e a l s a n d R e e n a c t m e n t s . — Laws 1993, 
ch. 72, § 10 repeals former § 30-3-3, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, allowing a court to order 
either party to pay for the separate support 
and maintenance of the adverse party and the 
children, and enacts the present section, effec-
tive May 3, 1993. 
ANALYSIS 
attorney fees. 
— Need. 
Determination. 
Attorney fees for appeal. 
Discretion of trial court. 
At torney fees. 
In accord with last paragra 
ume. See Morgan v. Morga. 
Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Attorney fees may be awan 
he support and maintenance 
jluding actions for the mod: 
justody. The decision to awa 
within the trial court's discret 
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utai 
Either party to a divorce a 
dered to pay the adverse part 
lefend the action. This incluc 
.ncurred on appeal. Maughan 
P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 198 
In order to award attorne 
•ourt must find the requesting 
inancial assistance and th> 
guested are reasonable. Rich 
P.2d 465 (Utah Ct. App. 19: 
Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057 (Utal 
Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.l 
\pp . 1990); Walters v. Waltt 
Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
— Need. 
Trial court did not abuse its 
iering each party to pay his o 
ney fees, where neither party 
i i e ability to pay the other 
rees. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.L 
\pp. 1990). 
Wife who did not prevail on . 
-he brought on appeal and d 
financial need on the record w 
nev fees on appeal. Haumont \ 
? 2 d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 199 
An award of attorney fees n 
evidence of the financial need 
-pouse, the ability of the othe 
and the reasonableness of the 
Rellv. Bell. 810 P.2d 489 (Utal 
Since the trial court, in aw 
ees. did not address the reaso 
A.L.R. — Death of obligor <• 
mg alimony, 79 A.L.R.4th 10 
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UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-7.5 
78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used. 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of 
the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the 
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
1989, ch. 214, § 6. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Train-
ing Partnership Act, S.S.L, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assis-
tance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly in-
come. 
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earn-
ings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each par-
ent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of 
tax returns from at least the most recent year to provide verification of 
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources 
according to the source. Verification of income from records maintained 
by the Office of Employment Security may be substituted for employer 
statements and income tax returns. 
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78-45-7.5 JUDICIAL CODE 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work his-
tory, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to estab-
lish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right, such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obliga-
tion of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered 
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. parent, the income shall be based" for "Income 
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5. shall be imputed to a parent based," and made 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- a stylistic change in Subsection (7)(c). 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, added the last Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214 
sentence in Subsection (5)(b), in Subsection became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to 
(7)(b) substituted "If income is imputed to a Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS support amount without finding that a mate-
rial change of circumstances had occurred 
since the previous order had been entered. 
Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 
Modification of award. 1990) (applying § 78-45-7.2(l)(b) prior to 1990 
When the parties had agreed to the amount amendment regarding impact of guidelines on 
of child support before the effective date of the existing support orders). 
child support guidelines, the trial court erred 
in modifying child support when no petition to Cited in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 
modify had been filed and in modifying the (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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Modification of award 
Cited. 
A-3 
ADDENDUM B 
No . . . . . . . . . . 
F I L E D 
APR 29 1993 
Clerk of Summit County ^ k , 
* CfcpWctofk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IH AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY COELHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
ALCIDES J. COELHO, 
Defendant . 
MINUTE ENTRY 
RULING 4-501 UCJA 
CASE # 91-11093 
The Court has rev iewed the Object ions of t he plaintiff and the Reply of the 
Defendant . The Cour t den ies t he Object ions and a p p r o v e s and e n t e r s t h i s da te 
t h e F ind ings and Decree as submi t t ed . 
F u r t h e r the Cour t s t a t e s t h a t within the plaint i ff ' s Object ions t h e r e is 
l a n g u a g e e x p r e s s i n g c o n c e r n as to the "limited time" allowed for t he h e a r i n g . The 
Defendan t ' s r e s p o n s e in p a r t s u g g e s t s t h a t t he Object ions of t h e Plaintiff a re 
des igned , in pa r t , to i n c r e a s e the "vu lne rab i l i t y" of the Cour t ' s decision on 
appea l . The Court s t a t e s t h a t it too felt conce rn as to the "time" avai lable for 
t r i a l . The day h a p p e n e d to be a day on which the Chief J u s t i c e called a spec ia l 
meeting of the Jud ic ia l Council of which t h e u n d e r s i g n e d is a member. As i t 
t u r n e d out , I was one and one-half h o u r s la te for t he meeting. 
In o r d e r to c o n s i d e r the magni tude of the conce rn , the Cour t i n v i t e s a 
Motion for a New Trial to be filed and a r g u e d if t h a t remains a conce rn . The c o u r t 
no tes t h a t t h e r e was no timely object ion to the p r o c e d u r e on the day of t h e t r i a l 
b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s x^ould like to c o n s i d e r t he p r e s e n t c o n c e r n s of t he p a r t i e s as to 
the adequacy of t h e i r p r e s e n t a t i o n s . Nei ther p a r t y should p resume as to the 
Cour t ' s p r e s e n t view in cons ide r ina a New Trial. The p r e s e n t concern of the Cour t B_1
 oormn 
is to determine if ei ther party believes they did not have a adequate opportunity 
to present their case and each should state what they vzould request , if anything, 
to be fur ther presented to the court . 
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No. 
B. L. DART (818) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 fc... 
F I L E D 
AP* 29 1993 
Qerk V Sv-nmi> County J^ 'IS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
MARY COELHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ALCIDES J. COELHO, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 11093 
Judge Young 
oooOooo 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on Thursday, the 11th day of February, 1993, at the hour of 9:00 
a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney Evelyn R. 
Saunders, and defendant appearing in person and by his attorney 
B. L. Dart, and plaintiff having testified and two accountants 
having testified and defendant's testimony having been proffered 
and other matters were submitted by proffer and the Court having 
received exhibits and the matter having been submitted and the 
Court being fully advised, hereby makes the following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and defendant were married in Park City, 
Utah on the 16th day of July, 1977, and since that time have been 
husband and wife. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant are both residents of 
Summit County, State of Utah, and have been for more than three 
months immediately prior to the filing of this action for 
divorce. 
3. Grounds. Differences have arisen between the 
parties which have made it impossible for them to continue with 
this marriage relationship. The parties have been separated 
since October, 1991, and the Court finds that grounds exist for 
entry of a Decree of Divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
4. Custody and Visitation. Three children have been 
born as issue of this marriage: Sara, born August 1, 1978, who 
is 14 years of age; Tony, born August 19, 1980, who is 12 years 
of age; and Emily, born September 29, 1986, who is six years of 
age. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties and consistent with 
the child custody evaluation filed in this action, plaintiff 
should be awarded the care, custody and control of Emily and 
Tony, subject to defendant's reasonable rights of visitation, 
which should be as follows: 
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a. The right to have these two younger children, 
each Monday evening from 5:00 p.m. to 8 p.m. for CCD and so long 
as they are attending CCD. 
b. The right to have the two younger children 
each Wednesday evening from 5:00 p.m. until Thursday morning and 
then take them to school. 
c. The right to have the two younger children 
each Saturday evening from 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. 
d. The right to have all three children each 
Christmas Day from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. 
e. All other major holidays to be alternated 
between the parties. 
f. During the summer school vacation period, the 
visitation schedule should change to alternating weekends and be 
adjusted so that all three children are together each weekend. 
g. The right to be informed of and attend all 
school activities, school performance and any extracurricular 
activities of the children, including but not limited to sporting 
events, to participate in parent-teacher conferences and have 
input into the important educational decisions of the children, 
and to be informed of any emergency health-care problems and the 
right to be informed of non-emergency medical problems within 48 
hours. 
h. Such other visitation upon which the parties 
can mutually agree. 
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Custody of Sara should be awarded to defendant 
subject to plaintiff reasonable and liberal rights of visitation 
as follows: 
a. The right to have Sara Thursday evenings at 
6:00 p.m. to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m. 
b. The right to have Sara each Christmas Eve 
from 5:00 p.m. to Christmas Day at 9:00 a.m. 
c. Major holidays to be alternated between the 
parties. 
d. Alternating weekends during the summer school 
vacation period to coordinate with the two younger children so 
that all three children are together each weekend. 
e. The right to be informed of and attend all 
school activities, school performance and any extracurricular 
activities of the children, including but not limited to sporting 
events, to participate in parent-teacher conferences and have 
input into the important educational decisions of the children, 
and to be informed of any emergency health-care problems and to 
be informed of any emergency health-care problems and the right 
to be informed of non-emergency medical problems within 48 hours. 
f. Such other visitation upon which the parties 
can mutually agree. 
5. Real Property. The house and real property 
located at 5328 Old Ranch Road, Park City, Utah, should be listed 
for sale with a real estate agent mutually acceptable to the 
4 
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parties, and a listing price to be arrived at between the parties 
in consultation with said real estate agent. Upon the sale of 
said house and real property, and after payment of the first 
mortgage obligation to Valley National Mortgage Co. which has a 
current balance of $137,000, the second mortgage line-of-credit 
to Valley Bank which have a current balance of $34,400, expenses 
of sale and any out-of-pocket expenses of either party necessary 
to place the home in marketable condition, and any moving 
expenses of plaintiff up to the amount of $5,000, any remaining 
equity should be divided equally between the parties. An 
exception to out-of-pocket expenses would be that any painting 
paid for by defendant should be without reimbursement up to the 
amount of $1,200. 
a. Plaintiff should have an option for 3 0 days 
from the 11th day of February, 1993, to retain said house and 
real property upon payment to defendant of his equity in the 
property which payment should be made within 3 0 days from the 
time of the exercise of the option. Defendant's equity should be 
established as one-half of the remaining amount after deducting 
the first and second mortgage obligations from the sum of 
$300,000, the appraised value of said house and real property. 
Plaintiff's option should be an exclusion from the listing of 
this property so that in the exercise of this option, no real 
estate commission will be incurred. 
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Plaintiff should have the further option of 
having the right of first refusal in the event of an offer by a 
third party on the home upon the same terms as said third-party 
offer so long as the amount received by defendant for his equity 
is no less than the amount he would have received if a third 
party offer had been accepted. 
b. Until such time as said house and real 
property has been sold, plaintiff should have the right of 
exclusive occupancy and should be responsible for payment of the 
first mortgage obligation. The second mortgage obligation should 
be paid one-half by each of the parties, and in the event that 
either party pays more than one-half, then that party is entitled 
to reimbursement of such excess of the other party's share at the 
time of the sale of said house and real property. 
c. Each party should be ordered to cooperate in 
any way necessary to expedite and facilitate the sale of said 
house and real property as the proceeds from the sale constitute 
the only major asset of the parties and these proceeds will be 
necessary to meet various liabilities of the parties for which no 
other funds are immediately available. 
d. Plaintiff has requested that any occupancy of 
the house not occur until after the end of the 1991-1992 school 
year. While the Court finds that it is in the best interests of 
the children that they be allowed to stay in this home through 
the school year, the Court feels that if a sale of the home would 
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be lost by placing this as a condition of sale, that the need of 
the parties to sell this home should take priority and preempt 
any concerns which may exist for the children remaining in the 
home for the duration of the school year. 
6. Personal Property. The personal property of the 
parties should be awarded as follows, with the award to either 
party to be free of any claim of the other: 
a. Each of the parties should be awarded any 
items of furniture and furnishings and personal possessions 
currently in his or her own possession except as otherwise 
expressly hereinafter provided. 
b. Each of the parties should make available to 
the other party any photographs for the purpose of allowing the 
other party to reproduce the photographs at his or her own 
expense or to keep duplicate photographs. 
c. Defendant should be awarded his personal 
property currently located in the home occupied by plaintiff. 
d. Defendant should be awarded his equipment and 
personal property stored in the garage and under the tarp on the 
property currently occupied by plaintiff. 
e. Plaintiff should be awarded the smaller 
Fraughton statuary and the larger Fraughton statuary should be 
placed in the hands of an art dealer on consignment for sale and 
with any net proceeds of sale to be divided between the parties. 
7 
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4-runner. 
Landcruiser. 
trailer. 
truck. 
Defendant should be awarded the 1984 Toyota 
Plaintiff should be awarded the 1983 Toyota 
Plaintiff should be awarded the horse 
Plaintiff should be awarded the 1976 Ford 
Plaintiff should be awarded her horses and 
tack. 
k. Plaintiff should be awarded the use of the 
snowblower so long as she resides in the Park City area, but it 
should be returned to defendant upon plaintiff moving from the 
Park City area. Defendant should have the right to use the 
snowblower to clear construction sites so long as his use does 
not interfere with plaintiff's need. 
1. Defendant is awarded his stock in Coelho 
Construction Company together with any liabilities. 
m. Plaintiff is awarded her premarital Kodak 
stock. 
n. Plaintiff is awarded rhe Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield health insurance premium refund and defendant should 
provide whatever cooperation he can in obtaining a new 
replacement check. 
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o. Defendant is awarded the stock in New Classic 
Development together with any liabilities. 
p. Defendant is awarded the parties1 interest in 
Solamere Partnership, together with any liabilities. 
7. Debts and obligations. The liabilities of the 
parties should be assumed and paid as follows: 
a. The first and second mortgages on the home at 
5328 Old Ranch Road, Park City, should be assumed and paid as set 
forth in paragraph 5 above. 
b. The 1992 income tax liability of the parties 
should be divided equally between the parties, and the parties 
should cooperate with their accountant, E. J. Passey, in the 
preparation of income tax returns either jointly or separately 
which will provide the lowest total tax liability. Defendant 
should be responsible for and pay for the cost of this tax 
preparation. 
c. Defendant should be responsible for any 
liabilities in connection with Coelho Construction Company, New 
Classic Development and Solamere Partnership. 
d. Each party should be responsible for the 
payment of any liabilities which he or she has individually 
incurred since the separation of the parties in October, 1991. 
8. Income Determination. The Court heard testimony 
from plaintiff concerning her income history and capacity to earn 
income, testimony from two accountants concerning the parties1 
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historical income and defendant's income for 1992, a proffer 
concerning defendant's current earning capacity, and copies of 
the parties' tax returns for the past ten years together with 
summaries. The Court having reviewed and considered all the 
evidence, finds that based upon the current circumstances 
defendant has an earning capacity of $5,000 per month and 
plaintiff has an earning capacity of $1,500 per month, and the 
Court's findings related to child support and alimony are based 
upon these income expectancies. 
Specifically, the Court finds that defendant 
is a small independent contractor who has had good years and bad 
years. It appears that 1992 was a good year bat the income 
related primarily to one project, and it further appears that 
defendant earned most of the 1992 income during the first part of 
the year, with very little income for the last part of the year 
and with no income for the first month of 1993. It is because of 
these circumstances that the Court finds the expectancy for 1993 
of defendant's income is the amount of $5,000 per month. 
Specifically, the Court finds that plaintiff 
is currently working at employment as a ski instructor and 
working with disabled children, earning an income substantially 
below what she has historically earned when she was active as a 
real estate sales person during the 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 
years, as reflected in plaintiff's own Exhibit 11. It is 
anticipated that plaintiff should be able to become more 
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gainfully employed and after a short period of time earn an 
income sufficient to meet her own needs based upon her 
demonstrated ability. 
9. Child Support. Consistent with the Child Support 
Guidelines of the State of Utah, the income determinations set 
forth in paragraph 8, and the custody arrangement between the 
parties as set forth in paragraph 4 above, defendant should pay 
to plaintiff as child support the sum of $619 per month, 
commencing with the month of February, 1993, as shown on the 
Child Support Worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit flAff. As a 
further obligation of support, defendant should be responsible to 
maintain the children on his currently-held health and accident 
insurance which has a $500 deductible and each of the parties 
should be responsible for one-half of all non-insured medical 
expenses incurred by any of the three children. 
Defendant should have the further obligation to 
pay to plaintiff one-half of any child care costs which she 
incurs which are work related. Plaintiff shall provide to 
defendant an accounting at the end of each month of the time and 
cost of child care. Defendant should then pay to plaintiff one-
half of said amount within ten days of receipt of the accounting. 
The Court finds that Tony is currently in need of 
therapy, and to the extent that expenses are incurred for 
necessary therapy as that necessity is indicated by his 
therapist, the cost of this therapy should be paid 70% by 
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B-13 
0 0 H ^  A 9 
defendant and 30% by plaintiff. This proration is roughly 
equatable to the proration of income between the parties and, 
further, takes into consideration the face that plaintiff should 
have some substantial responsibility for the cost of therapy as 
she has control of determining how often therapy is received. 
The parties have stipulated that Sara should be 
seen by a mutually-acceptable therapist on the basis of once a 
month and in the event of any opinion of the therapist that more 
therapy is required, then as often as necessary, with each of the 
parties to be responsible for one-half of the therapy. The 
choice of a mutually-acceptable therapist for Sara should be 
determined by the parties in consultation with Dr. Sam Goldstein. 
Any therapy for Sara with Michelle Miller should be paid by 
defendant. The division of this cost equally between the parties 
is different than the division related to Tony's therapy for the 
reason that defendant shall be responsible for all of the costs 
of Michelle Miller, who is the current therapist for Sara. 
Any obligation for payment of support or medical 
or therapy expenses shall continue so long as the children are 
minors and thereafter to high school graduation for any child who 
turns 18 prior to graduation. 
10. Life Insurance. So long cis he has an obligation 
for the payment of child support, defendant should be ordered to 
maintain a life insurance policy in the face amount of $250,000 
naming either the plaintiff's father, the plaintiff's mother or a 
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corporate fiduciary as the trustee for the benefit of the parties 
three children. 
11. Alimony. Based upon the findings which the Court 
has previously set forth above and based upon the living expenses 
of the parties as set forth in their respective exhibits, 
defendant should pay to plaintiff as alimony the sum of $1,000 a 
month commencing with the month of February, 1993, and continuing 
for a period of one year to allow plaintiff the opportunity to 
reestablish her income based upon her demonstrated historical 
earning capacity. At that time, plaintiff should have the right 
to petition the Court for a reevaluation to determine whether 
alimony should be terminated at that time or extended based upon 
the circumstances then existing. 
12. Restoration of maiden name. Plaintiff has 
requested and should be restored to her previous surname of Van 
Siclen. 
13. Attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiff proffered 
evidence of attorneys1 fees which she had incurred with her prior 
attorney Mary Corporon and with her present attorney Evelyn R. 
Saunders and the Court having considered the reasonableness of 
the fees and the relative ability of the parties to meet the cost 
of attorney's fees and taking into consideration that defendant 
shall be responsible for all his own fees, finds that it is 
reasonable that defendant should be responsible for payment of 
$3,000 to plaintiff for her attorneys' fees and costs incurred in 
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this action, which amount should be paid within 120 days from the 
11th day of February, 1993, or upon sale of the house and real 
property of the parties, whichever occurs first. 
14. Permanent restraining order. Each of the parties 
should be permanently restrained from in any way harassing, 
threatening or harming the other. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from 
defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, which 
Decree shall become final upon signing and entry. 
2. Custody and visitation is awarded as set forth in 
paragraph 4 of the Findings of Fact. 
3. The real property of the parties shall be sold and 
divided as provided in paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact. 
4. The personal property ot the parties is awarded as 
provided in paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact. 
5. The debts and obligations of the parties shall be 
assumed and paid as provided in paragraph 7 of the Findings of 
Fact. 
6. Plaintiff is awarded child support from defendant 
as provided in paragraph 9 of the Findings of Fact. 
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7. Defendant shall maintain life insurance for the 
benefit of the minor children as provided in paragraph 10 of the 
Findings of Fact. 
8. Plaintiff is awarded alimony from defendant as 
provided in paragraph 11 of the Findings of Fact. 
9. Plaintiff is restored to her maiden name of Van 
Siclen. 
10. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys1 fees and costs 
from defendant in the amount of $3,000 to be paid as provided in 
paragraph 13 of the Findings of Fact. 
11. Each of the parties is permanently restrained from 
in any way harassing, threatening or harming the other. 
12. Each of the parties is ordered to execute any 
documents and cooperate in any way necessary to effectuate the 
terms of the Decree of Divorce when it is entered. 
DATED t h i s
 AJSf-"day of $<1?UA , 1993 
BY THE COURT: y V?^?>?4* 
DISTRICT JUDG1 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of April, 1993, I 
mailed a copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW to: 
Evelyn Saunders 
401 Main Street 
P. O. Box 3418 
Park City, UT 84060 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
•
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B. L. DART (818) "EXHIBIT A" 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
MARY COELHO, : 
Plaintiff, : CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET 
(SPLIT CUSTODY) 
v. : 
ALCIDES J. COELHO, : Civil No. 11093 
Defendant. : Judge Young 
oooOooo 
I BASE AWARD CALCULATION 
1. Number of Children 
2. % Children w/each parent 
3a. Gross Monthly Income 
3b. Pre-Existing Alimony 
I 3c. Pre-Existing Support 
1 4. Adjusted Monthly Gross 
5. Base Combined Child 
Support from Tables 
6. Proportionate Share % 
|| 7 . Parent' s Share Support $ 
8. Mother owes father 
|| 9. Father owes mother 
10. Children's health 
insurance premiums paid 
|| 11. Child care expense 
12. NET OBLIGATIONS 
13. BASE SUPPORT AWARD all 
1 12 months (father to mother) 
1 14. CHILD CARE at 50% 
MOTHER 
2 
.67 
1,500.00 
1,500.00 
lllll 
0.23 
323.61 
106.79 
lllll 
106.79 
lllll 
FATHER 
1 
.33 
5,000.00 
5,000.00 
lllll 
0.77 
1,083.39 
lllll 
125.81 
725.87 
///// 
! COMBINED j 
3 
///// 1 
///// 1 
///// 1 
6,500.00 
1,407.00 
11111
 l 11111
 1 
11111
 1 
0.00 1 
/ / / / / 
619.08 
o.oo 1 
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B. L. DART (818) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
310 South Main, Suite 13 3 0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
*r 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
F I L E D " " 
APR "3 1993 l5:/<f 
Clerk of Summit County J 
DepvtyOtk 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
MARY COELHO, : 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
ALCIDES J. COELHO, : Case No. 11093 
Defendant. : Judge Young 
oooOooo 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on Thursday, the 11th day of February, 1993, at the hour of 9:00 
a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney Evelyn R, 
Saunders, and defendant appearing in person and by his attorney 
B. L. Dart, and the plaintiff having testified and two 
accountants having testified and defendantfs testimony having 
been proffered and other matters were submitted by proffer and 
the Court having received exhibits and the matter having been 
submitted and the Court being fully advised and having made and 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
rcc;;003$£ a 51 
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1. Decree and Grounds. Each of the parties is 
awarded a Decree of Divorce one from the other on the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences, which shall become final upon signing 
and entry. 
2. Custody and Visitation. Three children have been 
born as issue of this marriage: Sara, born August 7, 1978, who 
is 14 years of age; Tony, born August 19, 1980, who is 12 years 
of age; and Emily, born September 29, 1986, who is six years of 
age. Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control of Emily 
and Tony, subject to defendant's reasonable rights of visitation, 
which shall be as follows: 
a. The right to have these two younger children, 
each Monday evening from 5:00 p.m. to 8 Ip.m. for CCD and so long 
as they are attending CCD. 
b. The right to have the two younger children 
each Wednesday evening from 5:00 p.m. until Thursday morning and 
then take them to school. 
c. The right to have the two younger children 
each Saturday evening from 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. 
d. The right to have all three children each 
Christmas Day from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. 
e. All other major holidays to be alternated 
between the parties. 
B-20 
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f. During the summer school vacation period, the 
visitation schedule shall change to alternating weekends and be 
adjusted so that all three children are together each weekend. 
g. The right to be informed of and attend all 
school activities, school performance and any extracurricular 
activities of the children, including but not limited to sporting 
events, to participate in parent-teacher conferences and have 
input into the important educational decisions of the children, 
and to be informed of any emergency health-care problems and the 
right to be informed of non-emergency medical problems within 48 
hours. 
h. The right to be informed of all school 
activities, school performance and any extracurricular activities 
where the children are performing and any emergency medical 
health-care problems. 
i. Such other visitation upon which the parties 
can mutually agree. 
Custody of Sara is awarded to defendant subject to 
plaintiff reasonable and liberal rights of visitation as follows: 
a. The right to have Sara Thursday evenings at 
6:00 p.m. to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m. 
b. The right to have Sara each Christmas Eve 
from 5:00 p.m. to Christmas Day at 9:00 a.m. 
c. Major holidays to be alternated between the 
parties. 
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d. Alternating weekends during the summer school 
vacation period to coordinate with the two younger children so 
that all three children are together each weekend. 
e. The right to be informed of and attend all 
school activities, school performance and any extracurricular 
activities of the children, including but not limited to sporting 
events, to participate in parent-teacher conferences and have 
input into the important educational decisions of the children, 
and to be informed of any emergency health-care problems and to 
be informed of any non-emergency medical problems within 48 
hours. 
f. Such other visitation upon which the parties 
can mutually agree. 
3. Real Property. The house and real property 
located at 5328 Old Ranch Road, Park City, Utah, is ordered to be 
listed for sale with a real estate agent mutually acceptable to 
the parties, and a listing price to be arrived at between the 
parties in consultation with said real estate agent. Upon the 
sale of said house and real property, and after payment of the 
first mortgage obligation to Valley National Mortgage Co. which 
has a current balance of $137,000, the second mortgage line-of-
credit to Valley Bank which have a current balance of $34,400, 
expenses of sale and any out-of-pocket expenses of either party 
necessary to place the home in marketable condition, and any 
moving expenses of plaintiff up to the amount of $5,000, any 
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remaining equity is ordered to be divided equally between the 
parties. An exception to out-of-pocket expenses would be that 
any painting paid for by defendant shall be without reimbursement 
up to the amount of $1,200. 
a. Plaintiff shall have an option for 30 days 
from the 11th day of February, 1993, to retain said house and 
real property upon payment to defendant of his equity in the 
property which payment is ordered to be made within 3 0 days from 
the time of the exercise of the option. Defendant's equity shall 
be established as one-half of the remaining amount after 
deducting the first and second mortgage obligations from the sum 
of $300,000, the appraised value of said house and real property. 
Plaintiff's option shall be an exclusion from the listing of this 
property so that in the exercise of this option, no real estate 
commission will be incurred. 
Plaintiff shall have the further option of 
having the right of first refusal in the event of an offer by a 
third party on the home upon the same terms as said third-party 
offer so long as the amount received by defendant for his equity 
is no less than the amount he would have received if a third 
party offer had been accepted. 
b. Until such time as said house and real 
property has been sold, plaintiff shall have the right of 
exclusive occupancy and is ordered to be responsible for payment 
of the first mortgage obligation. The second mortgage obligation 
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shall be paid one-half by each of the parties, and in the event 
that either party pays more than one-half, then that party is 
entitled to reimbursement of such excess of the other party's 
share at the time of the sale of said house and real property. 
c. Each party is ordered to cooperate in any way 
necessary to expedite and facilitate the sale of said house and 
real property as the proceeds from the sale constitute the only 
major asset of the parties and these proceeds will be necessary 
to meet various liabilities of the parties for which no other 
funds are immediately available. 
d. While it is in the best interests of the 
children that they be allowed to stay in this home through the 
end of the 1991-92 school year, if a sale of the home would be 
lost by placing this as a condition of sale, the need of the 
parties to sell this home shall take priority and preempt any 
concerns which may exist for the children remaining in the home 
for the duration of the school year. 
4. Personal Property. The personal property of the 
parties is awarded as follows, with the award to either party to 
be free of any claim of the other: 
a. Each of the parties is awarded any items of 
furniture and furnishings and persomil possessions currently in 
his or her own possession except as otherwise expressly 
hereinafter provided. 
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b. Each of the parties is ordered to make 
available to the other party any photographs for the purpose of 
allowing the other party to reproduce the photographs at his or 
her own expense or to keep duplicate photographs. 
c. Defendant is awarded his personal property 
currently located in the home occupied by plaintiff. 
d. Defendant is awarded his equipment and 
personal property stored in the garage and under the tarp on the 
property currently occupied by plaintiff. 
e. Plaintiff is awarded the smaller Fraughton 
statuary and the larger Fraughton statuary is ordered to be 
placed in the hands of an art dealer on consignment for sale and 
with any net proceeds of sale to be divided between the parties. 
f. Defendant is awarded the 1984 Toyota 4-
runner. 
Landcruiser. 
Plaintiff is awarded the 1983 Toyota 
h. Plaintiff is awarded the horse trailer. 
i. Plaintiff is awarded the 1976 Ford truck. 
j. Plaintiff is awarded her horses and tack. 
k. Plaintiff is awarded the use of the 
snowblower so long as she resides in the Park City area, but it 
is ordered to be returned to defendant upon plaintiff moving from 
the Park City area. Defendant shall have the right to use the 
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snowblower to clear construction sites so long as his use does 
not interfere with plaintiff's need. 
1. Defendant is awarded his stock in Coelho 
Construction Company together with any liabilities. 
m. Plaintiff is awarded her premarital Kodak 
stock. 
n. Plaintiff is awarded the Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield health insurance premium refund and defendant is ordered 
to provide whatever cooperation he can in obtaining a new 
replacement check. 
o. Defendant is awarded the stock in New Classic 
Development together with any liabilities. 
p. Defendant is awarded the parties1 interest in 
Solamere Partnership, together with any liabilities. 
5. Debts and obligations. The liabilities of the 
parties are ordered to be assumed and paid as follows: 
a. The first and second mortgages on the home at 
5328 Old Ranch Road, Park City, shall be assumed and paid as set 
forth in paragraph 5 above. 
b. The 1992 income tax liability of the parties 
is ordered to be divided equally between the parties, and the 
parties are ordered to cooperate with their accountant, E. J. 
Passey, in the preparation of income tax returns either jointly 
or separately which will provide the lowest total tax liability. 
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Defendant is ordered to be responsible for and pay for the cost 
of this tax preparation. 
c. Defendant is ordered to be responsible for 
any liabilities in connection with Coelho Construction Company, 
New Classic Development and Solamere Partnership. 
d. Each party is ordered to be responsible for 
the payment of any liabilities which he or she has individually 
incurred since the separation of the parties in October, 1991. 
6. Child Support. Consistent with the Child Support 
Guidelines of the State of Utah, and based upon an income of 
$5,000 attributed to the defendant and $1,500 attributed to the 
plaintiff, and based upon the custody arrangement between the 
parties as set forth in above, defendant is ordered to pay to 
plaintiff as child support the sum of $619 per month, commencing 
with the month of February, 1993. As a further obligation of 
support, defendant is ordered to be responsible to maintain the 
children on his currently-held health and accident insurance 
which has a $500 deductible and each of tne parties is ordered to 
be responsible for one-half of all non-insured medical expenses 
incurred by any of the three children. 
Defendant shall have the further obligation to pay 
to plaintiff one-half of any child care costs which she incurs 
which are work related. Plaintiff shall provide to defendant an 
accounting at the end of each month of the time and cost of child 
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care. Defendant shall then pay to plaintiff one-half of said 
amount within ten days of receipt of the accounting. 
To the extent that expenses are incurred for 
necessary therapy for the parties minor son, Tony, as that 
necessity is indicated by his therapist, the cost of this therapy 
is ordered to be paid 70% by defendant and 30% by plaintiff. 
The parties daughter Sara shall be seen by a 
mutually-acceptable therapist on the basis of once a month and in 
the event of any opinion of the therapist that more therapy is 
required, then as often as necessary, with each of the parties to 
be responsible for one-half of the therapy. The choice of a 
mutually-acceptable therapist for Sara shall be determined by the 
parties in consultation with Dr. Sam Goldstein. Any therapy for 
Sara with Michelle Miller shall be paid by defendant. The 
division of this cost equally between the parties is different 
than the division related to Tony's therapy for the reason that 
defendant shall be responsible for all of the costs of Michelle 
Miller, who is the current therapist for Sara. 
Any obligation for payment of support or medical 
or therapy expenses shall continue so long as the children are 
minors and thereafter to high school graduation for any child who 
turns 18 prior to graduation. 
7. Life Insurance. So long as he has an obligation 
for the payment of child support, defendant is ordered to 
maintain a life insurance policy in the face amount of $250,000 
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naming either the plaintiff's father, the plaintiff's mother or a 
corporate fiduciary as the trustee for the benefit of the parties 
three children. 
8. Alimony. Based upon the present financial 
circumstances of the parties, defendant is ordered to pay to 
plaintiff as alimony the sum of $1,000 a month commencing with 
the month of February, 1993, and continuing for a period of one 
year to allow plaintiff the opportunity to reestablish her income 
based upon her demonstrated historical earning capacity. At that 
time, plaintiff shall have the right to petition the Court for a 
reevaluation to determine whether alimony should be terminated at 
that time or extended based upon the circumstances then existing. 
9. Restoration of maiden name. Plaintiff is restored 
to her previous surname of Van Siclen. 
10. Attorney's fees and costs. Defendant is ordered 
to pay $3,000 to plaintiff for her attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in this action, which amount is ordered to be paid 
within 120 days from the 11th day of February, 1993, or upon sale 
of the house and real property of the parties, whichever occurs 
first. 
11. Permanent restraining order. Each of the parties 
is permanently restrained from in any way harassing, threatening 
or harming the other. 
12. Mutual Cooperation. Each of the parties is 
ordered to execute any documents and cooperate in any way 
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necessary to effectuate the terms of this Decree of Divorce when 
it is entered. 
DATED this j^*_day of (/LyyuA 
BY THE^COURT: 
L^WM 
- '""J5 
l-£A CO r^r 
SO: 
DISTRICT 
MAILING CERTIFICA1 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of April, 1993, I 
mailed a copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to 
Evelyn Saunders 
401 Main Street 
P. O. Box 3418 
Park City, UT 84060 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
nT'.nrj'Ky / \ t rCiirkJ 
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